

Tribunal Tribune



*competition***tribunal**
SOUTH AFRICA

VIEWPOINT

CONCENTRATION
AND CREEPING
MERGERS IN THE
AUTOMOTIVE
RETAIL SECTOR

**SEPTEMBER
2026**



CASE MANAGER PERSPECTIVE

LESSONS FROM NEW
HOLDCO/EDGARS
AND MAKATE

SNEAK PEEK: INTEGRATED ANNUAL REPORT

CASE HIGHLIGHTS FOR
2025/26

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ABOUT THE TRIBUNAL

South Africa's competition regime is founded on the Competition Act which promotes competitive markets, seeks to address concentrated economic power and supports broader participation in the economy. The Act established three independent institutions: the Competition Commission (investigates and prosecutes); the Competition Tribunal (adjudicates and imposes a penalty or remedy); and the Competition Appeal Court (hears appeals or reviews).

The Competition Tribunal is South Africa's specialist competition adjudicative body and the court of first instance for competition matters. It hears and decides cases involving mergers, restrictive practices and abuse of dominance, and considers matters referred by the Competition Commission and, in certain circumstances, by members of the public.

Acting independently and impartially, the Tribunal's decisions carry the same legal standing as those of the High Court and may be appealed or reviewed in the Competition Appeal Court and, in certain instances, to the Constitutional Court.

The Tribunal's work sits at the intersection of law, economics and public policy. In carrying out its mandate, it contributes to promoting competitive and inclusive markets in the public interest, while supporting an economic environment that encourages investment, innovation, efficiency and consumer choice.

The Competition Tribunal is South Africa's specialist competition adjudicative body and the court of first instance for competition matters.



The Tribunal may:

- Approve or prohibit mergers, with or without conditions;
- Adjudicate cases involving anti-competitive conduct (cartels and abuse of dominance cases);
- Consider and confirm consent agreements;
- Hear appeals arising from market inquiries; and
- Issue orders in terms of the Competition Act.

Guided by the Constitution and the Competition Act, the Tribunal performs its functions independently and without fear, favour or prejudice, while remaining responsive to South Africa's evolving economic landscape.

Concentration and Creeping Mergers in the Automotive Retail Sector

An Assessment of the Approach in Motus / Penta Menlyn

By Thabiso Poswa and Princess Ka-Siboto



The South African automotive retail sector has experienced a sustained trend towards consolidation over the past decade, largely driven by the expansion strategies of large, vertically and horizontally integrated dealership groups. These strategies frequently involve the acquisition of individual franchised dealerships, often operating in geographically localised markets and under distinct brands. While such acquisitions are typically small in scale and frequently fall below dominance thresholds, their cumulative impact has the potential to materially alter competitive dynamics over time. This pattern raises concerns commonly associated with creeping or serial mergers, where no single transaction appears to substantially lessen competition, but where the aggregate effect of multiple acquisitions may do so.

Automotive retailing is characterised by a combination of localised demand conditions and broader national competitive dynamics. Consumers generally purchase and service vehicles within relatively narrow geographic catchment areas, which has led competition authorities to define geographic markets on a local or regional basis in merger assessments. At the same time, dealership groups increasingly operate on a national scale, benefitting from economies of scope and scale in procurement, financing, marketing, data analytics and relationships with original equipment manufacturers.



This duality creates conditions in which serial acquisitions within overlapping local markets can incrementally reduce competitive constraints without necessarily producing a large market share accretion in any single transaction.

As Sha'ista Goga, Director of Acacia Economics, observes in her analysis of serial acquisitions¹, competition concerns typically arise not because serial acquisitions are inherently anticompetitive, but because cumulative acquisitions that appear benign when assessed individually may increase market power when viewed holistically over time. This concern is particularly acute in industries with localised geographic markets, adjacent product or brand competition, or structural features that amplify bargaining power once a firm reaches sufficient scale. The South African automotive retail sector exhibits several of these characteristics, including high fixed costs, significant entry barriers linked to OEM franchising, and increasing reliance on scale.

The Commission has long recognised the risks posed by creeping mergers in other sectors, including healthcare, retail, publishing and security services. However, as Goga notes, enforcement has historically struggled to address these risks effectively due to the transaction-specific nature of merger control and the reliance on dominance thresholds that screen out many small but strategically significant acquisitions.

Legislative amendments to the Competition Act, particularly the inclusion of section 12A(2)(k), now expressly permit the Commission to consider other mergers engaged in by a party over a stipulated period when assessing a notified transaction. This provision is intended to enable a more cumulative and dynamic assessment of acquisition strategies, provided that at least one transaction is subject to review.

Against this background, the Commission's assessment of creeping mergers in the Motus Group Limited and Penta Menlyn transaction ("Motus/Penta")² warrants careful consideration. In its recommendation, the Commission explicitly acknowledged Motus's history of acquisitions and noted that Motus had undertaken eleven acquisitions between 2020 and 2025, four of which were located within an 80-kilometre radius of the target dealership. The Commission further observed that none of these prior acquisitions involved overlapping brands with those operated by Penta Menlyn, namely Chery, Omoda and Jaecoo, and concluded that creeping merger concerns were unlikely to arise.

The Commission's analysis demonstrates a commendable awareness of the risk of creeping mergers and reflects an effort to situate the transaction within Motus's broader acquisition strategy. The geographic filtering of prior transactions is consistent with accepted approaches to market definition in automotive retailing, and the recognition that brand-level competition is central to dealership rivalry appropriately reflects the franchised nature of the sector. In this respect, the Commission's approach aligns with the first step of the analytical framework proposed by Goga, namely identifying the nature of the serial acquisition strategy and the most plausible theories of harm.

However, the assessment also reveals certain limitations when measured against the broader guidance articulated in the literature on serial acquisitions.

¹ Goga, S. (2024). Serial Acquisitions: A Framework for Analysis. Competition Commission 18th Annual Competition Conference. www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Shaista-Goga-Serial-acquisitions.pdf

² CT Case No.: LM142Nov25

In particular, the Commission appears to have placed decisive weight on the absence of direct brand overlap between the current transaction and prior acquisitions. While brand-level competition is undoubtedly important, this approach risks understating the competitive significance of multi-brand ownership within local markets. As Goga cautions, serial acquisitions may raise concerns even where competition appears to occur in adjacent or differentiated markets, especially where common ownership alters incentives, facilitates coordination, or enhances bargaining power.

The Commission's analysis also does not appear to have engaged in a cumulative assessment of concentration trends within the relevant local markets. There is no indication that changes over time in Motus's aggregate dealership footprint, across brands, was examined, nor was the impact of serial acquisitions on local competitive constraints, entry conditions or the viability of independent dealerships assessed. Goga emphasises that effective analysis of serial acquisitions requires careful consideration of how incremental changes in concentration may shift competitive dynamics, even where no single transaction crosses a clear tipping point. The absence of a dynamic concentration analysis suggests that the creeping merger assessment remained largely transaction-centric.

Furthermore, the Commission did not appear to consider a counterfactual scenario in which Motus's prior acquisitions had not occurred, or in which independent dealerships continued to operate and expand within the relevant catchment areas. Goga highlights the importance of counterfactual analysis in serial acquisition cases, particularly to understand whether cumulative acquisitions have eliminated maverick firms, softened competition or altered bargaining power in ways that only become apparent over time. Without this assessment, it is difficult to determine whether the current transaction forms part of a broader consolidation strategy that may raise competition concerns.

Overall, while the Competition Commission's conclusion that the Motus/Penta transaction is unlikely to substantially lessen competition in isolation may be justified on the available evidence, its treatment of creeping mergers appears relatively narrow in scope. The analysis recognises the existence of a serial acquisition strategy but stops short of engaging with the deeper structural and dynamic issues that the automotive retail sector presents. As consolidation in this sector continues, there may be a need for the Commission to apply the cumulative analytical framework, particularly in markets characterised by localised competition and increasing national concentration.

In conclusion, the Motus/Penta matter illustrates both the progress and the remaining challenges in addressing creeping mergers under South African competition law. The statutory framework now permits a broader consideration of serial acquisitions, but its effective application depends on a willingness to move beyond formalistic indicators such as brand overlap and to engage more fully with cumulative concentration, market dynamics and counterfactual outcomes. As the automotive retail sector continues to consolidate, these considerations are likely to become increasingly salient in future merger assessments.





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SOUTH AFRICA



TRIBUNAL

WEBSITE

WWW.COMPTTRIB.CO.ZA

The Tribunal's website is a comprehensive and accessible resource for stakeholders, practitioners and the public. It provides up-to-date information on cases, decisions, hearing schedules and Tribunal news, supporting transparency and informed engagement. With its user-friendly design and regularly updated content, the website is an essential platform for anyone seeking authoritative insight into the Tribunal's work and its role in advancing competition in the public interest.

HEARINGS

DECIDED CASES

LATEST DECISIONS

FORMS

PRESS RELEASES

HEARING CALENDAR

The Tribunal's powers to vary or replace merger conditions:

Lessons from New Holdco/Edgars and Makate

By Sinethemba Mbeki and Theresho Galane



Introduction

The Competition Tribunal is often tasked with complex mergers that concern public interest considerations, and the conditions imposed to safeguard broader economic or social objectives. A question arose in merger proceedings as to whether the Tribunal may replace or vary conditions imposed in an earlier transaction without a formal variation application under section 66 of the Competition Act, 1998 ("the Act"). This note considers that question in the context of the transaction between VCAP1 and the CellAir Group.

Background

On 7 October 2025, the Tribunal approved the large merger in which VCAP1 Alliances (Pty) Ltd ("VCAP1") intended to acquire 100% of the shares in various firms collectively referred to as the "CellAir Group" (VCAP1/CellAir)¹.

The Tribunal found that the proposed transaction was unlikely to raise competition concerns.

However, in relation to public interest, the approval of the transaction would result in a dilution of the employee share ownership programme ("2024 ESOP Conditions") established pursuant to an earlier merger approved by the Tribunal in 2024 involving VCAP1 and various other firms (the "Prior Transaction")².

This dilution arose from the funding arrangements required to implement the present transaction, as well as the subsequent opportunity to acquire interests in the CellAir Group. Notwithstanding this, the merging parties and the Commission submitted that, although the percentage shareholding held by the ESOP would be reduced, the per-employee value of the ESOP would increase, and a significantly larger number of employees would participate in the scheme.

¹ CT Case No.: LM037Jun25.

² CT Case No.: LM174Feb24.

While the Tribunal accepted that the proposed adjustment to the 2024 ESOP Conditions, together with the enhanced underlying value of the VCAP1 business, would improve employee benefits, a distinct legal issue arose. Specifically, the Tribunal was called upon to determine whether it could vary the 2024 ESOP Conditions, imposed in a separate transaction involving the same acquiring firm but a different target, without a formal variation application.

The Tribunal concluded that a formal variation application was necessary before it could issue a decision in the present transaction. The merging parties accordingly filed a variation application on an expedited basis, given the commercial timing constraints associated with the transaction. The Tribunal approved the variation on 2 October 2025 and, pursuant to that determination, subsequently approved the proposed transaction.

Statutory framework

The functions of the Tribunal are set out in section 27 of the Act, which confers on it the power to adjudicate any matter before it in terms of the Act. Section 27 therefore delineates the matters that fall within the competence of the Tribunal and provides the legal basis for the exercise of its powers.³

In the request for a variation of the 2024 ESOP Conditions in the VCAP1/CellAir merger proceedings, the merging parties submitted that the Tribunal is competent to replace or vary previously imposed merger conditions with new or revised conditions in the course of the 2025 proceedings, without the need for a formal variation application. In this regard, they relied on section 27(1)(d) of the Competition Act and case law discussed below. Section 27(1) (d) of the Act states as follows:

(1) The Tribunal may –

(d) make any ruling or order necessary or incidental to the performance of its functions in terms of this Act

Although this provision is framed in broad terms, it must be exercised in line with the Act's governing provisions. In other words, the Tribunal does not possess inherent jurisdiction to vary or replace conditions not brought before it, even if such variations may serve economic or public interest objectives.⁴

Section 66 of the Act sets out the formal procedure by which the Tribunal may vary conditions previously imposed in a merger approval. The provision ensures that any amendment to existing conditions follows due process, including, inter alia, notifying affected parties and affording them an opportunity to make representations, thereby safeguarding procedural fairness. The merging parties, however, submitted that the Tribunal possesses all the necessary information to substitute the previously imposed merger conditions with new or revised conditions without the need for a formal variation application.

Case precedent: New Holdco/Edgars

The merging parties referred to the Tribunal's decision in New Holdco and Edgars Consolidated Stores Limited ("New Holdco/Edgars")⁵, where the Tribunal replaced previous conditions that it had imposed in the first transaction involving the restructuring of Parentco Proprietary Limited and Edcon Limited ("Parentco/Edcon")⁶.

The New Holdco/Edgars transaction followed an unsuccessful attempt to restructure the Edcon

³ Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Ltd (CCT 61/11) [2012] ZACC 8; 2012 (7) BCLR 667 (CC) (12 April 2012), para 25

⁴ Life Wise (Pty) Ltd t/a Eldan Auto Body v Competition Commission of South Africa (197/CACNov21) [2022] ZACAC 3 (8 April 2022).

⁵ CT Case No.: LM270Mar19. The Commission noted that the public interest conditions proposed in this merger are similar to those imposed in the Parentco/Edcon merger. The Economic Development Department and the merging parties agreed that these conditions be transferred to the present transaction, thereby ensuring the continuation of Edcon Group's public interest commitments.

⁶ CT Case No.: LM117Sep16. This merger involved a consortium of creditors, referred to as "Parentco", acquiring the entire issued share capital of the Edcon Group. The transaction was aimed at restructuring the Edcon Group by its creditors and management, in an effort to avert business rescue or liquidation proceedings.

Group through the Parentco/Edcon merger in 2016. The Parentco/Edcon merger involved the acquisition of all issued shares in Edcon by Parentco to avoid liquidation or business rescue, and was approved subject to conditions negotiated with the erstwhile Economic Development Department. These conditions addressed employment, procurement of South African brands, and Black Economic Empowerment.

In approving the New Holdco/Edgars merger, the Tribunal imposed new conditions, expressly stating: “As from the Approval Date, the conditions set out herein shall replace the Previous Conditions which shall cease to be of force and effect”.

The merging parties cited this merger as an example where the Tribunal replaced conditions imposed in a prior transaction without requiring a formal variation application. What the Tribunal did was to replace the prior conditions, rather than varying them.

Having regard to the merging parties’ submissions, the Tribunal was of the view that the facts surrounding the New Holdco/Edgars and Parentco/Edcon mergers were distinguishable from the VCAP1/CellAir transaction. Those cases involved replacing conditions in the same transaction, whereas the VCAP1/CellAir matter concerns different targets and the 2024 ESOP Conditions were not before the Tribunal.⁷

The Tribunal is enjoined to exercise its powers judicially and within the confines of its statutory mandate.⁸ The Competition Appeal Court in *Life Wise (Pty) Ltd t/a Eldan Auto Body v Competition Commission of South Africa*⁹

emphasised that the Tribunal’s powers are confined to those conferred by the Act and must be exercised within the framework of the issues properly before it.

The Tribunal noted that the merging parties’ proposed approach, seeking to vary conditions in merger proceedings without a formal variation application, raises both pragmatic and legal questions, echoing the principles set out by the Constitutional Court in *Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Makate and Another (“Makate”)*¹⁰.

This was concerning a cross-appeal issue that arose before the Constitutional Court at the hearing, whereby it was argued that a court that determines an issue that is not before it (i.e., an issue in respect of which there ought to have been a cross-appeal, which was not brought) acts beyond its jurisdiction and thus in breach of the rule of law.

The principle noted in the Makate case is that to determine an issue that is not before a court (or a Tribunal in this context) results in an act beyond the courts’ jurisdiction and breach of the rule of law.

While it is accepted that section 27(1) of the Act, empowers the Tribunal to *make any ruling or order necessary or incidental to the performance of its functions* in terms of the Act, this must be exercised in accordance with the governing provisions of the Act. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is triggered by empowering provisions of the Act in any matter. It does not have inherent jurisdiction to consider or make rulings on matters not brought before it.¹¹

⁷ VCAP1/CellAir at para 47

⁸ *Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Ltd and Another* [2012] ZASCA 6. While SCA’s decision was set aside by the Constitutional Court in *Competition Commission of South Africa v Senwes Ltd* (CCT 61/11) [2012] ZACC 6; 2012 (7) BCLR 667 (CC) [12 April 2012], it also affirmed that true that the Tribunal can exercise only those powers given to it by the Act, at para 49

⁹ *Life Wise (Pty) Ltd t/a Eldan Auto Body v Competition Commission of South Africa* (197/CACNov21) [2022] ZACAC 3 [8 April 2022]

¹⁰ *Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v Makate and Another* [2025] ZACC 13 at para 102.

¹¹ In *Ledla Structural Development (Pty) Ltd and Others v Special Investigating Unit* (CCT 319/21) [2023] ZACC 8; 2023 (6) BCLR 709 (CC); 2023 (2) SACR 1 (CC) (10 March 2023), the Constitutional Court once again elucidates the distinctions between such statutory bodies and Courts.

Distinguishing replacement from variation

As noted by the Tribunal, the critical distinction emerges when comparing the New Holdco/Edgars transaction with the VCAP1/CellAir transaction. In New Holdco/Edgars, the Tribunal replaced conditions that were expressly before it, whereas a variation involves amending conditions in an existing order. Moreover, New Holdco/Edgars involved replacing conditions in the same transaction with conditions brought before the Tribunal, unlike the VCAP1/CellAir transaction.

In contrast, the VCAP1/CellAir transaction comprised of two different target firms, namely Utilities World and others (in LM174Feb24) and CellAir Group (the subsequent transaction). The variation sought by the merging parties relates to conditions imposed in the earlier Utilities World merger. The Commission also recommended that the VCAP1/CellAir merger be approved without conditions. Consequently, the 2024 ESOP Conditions were not before the Tribunal for replacement as noted above.

Given the above, the Tribunal held that any amendment or variation to the 2024 ESOP conditions must be pursued through a formal variation application under section 66 or 1.Rule 42(3)(b)(ii), or by proposing new conditions in the current merger that would effectively replace the 2024 conditions.

Conclusion

In the VCAP1/CellAir transaction, the Tribunal was asked to vary conditions imposed in a previous merger that was not before it. For legal certainty, the Tribunal distinguished this case from New Holdco/Edgars, which demonstrates that, in appropriate circumstances, merger conditions can be replaced. The Tribunal therefore held that, since the matters were distinguishable, attempting to vary those conditions without following the formal procedural avenues prescribed by the Act could result in the Tribunal deciding on matters not properly brought before it, as noted in Makate.



Sneak peek



The Tribunal's 2025/26 Integrated Annual Report, covering the period April 2025 - March 2026, is soon to be tabled in Parliament. The report provides an overview of the organisation's performance, adjudicative activities, governance, financial performance and organisational developments during the year. It will be available on the Tribunal's website at www.comptrib.co.za. On the following two pages, we provide case highlights from the report.

HIGHLIGHTS FOR 2025/26



OVERALL CASES



<151 total cases heard
(excluding pre-hearings)



126 cases heard on
the merits



32 pre-hearings
(pre-hearings excluded
from total cases heard)



153 orders issued



120 reasons issued



25 interlocutory/procedural
cases heard



5 interim relief cases heard,
3 decided



PENALTIES



Total amount for
penalties imposed was
R44 447 100



85% of penalties imposed
were for cartel conduct



Highest penalty imposed:
R30 million
(WesBank/Toyota market
allocation matter)

HIGHLIGHTS FOR 2025/26



MERGERS



99% of merger hearings/pre-hearings held within 10 business days

(balance not heard in 10 days due to, inter alia, availability of parties and/or Tribunal members)



100% of merger orders delivered within 10 business days



87% of reasons for mergers issued within 20 business days
(balance not issued in 20 days due to, inter alia, the nature of the cases which raised complex legal and/or economic and/or public interest issues and capacity constraints at the case management/member levels)



101

mergers decided:

- 26** approved with conditions
- 18** approved with public interest conditions only
- 5** approved with both competition and public interest conditions
- 3** approved with competition conditions only
- 0** mergers prohibited



CONSENT/SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

17

consent/settlement agreements confirmed

- 14** involved cartel conduct
- 2** involved failure to notify a merger
- 1** involved abuse of dominance



INTERLOCUTORY/PROCEDURAL (29 IN TOTAL)

10

discovery applications decided



4

intervention applications decided



4

strike out applications decided



3

variation applications decided



2

exception applications decided



2

extension applications decided



1

dismissal application decided



1

subpoena challenge decided



1

application to supplement decided



1

condonation application decided

Giving Back

The Tribunal's Mandela Day CSI Initiative

By Gillian de Gouveia



There is something quietly hopeful about planting a seedling. You put a seedling into the earth knowing that its greatest work lies somewhere in the future: in the fruit (or vegetables) it may bear and the nourishment it may offer to people you may never meet.

That was the spirit behind the Competition Tribunal's Mandela Day 2026 initiative, which saw it join hands with the *Viva Foundation*, a non-profit organisation, in Refilwe, Cullinan, with vegetable seedlings for its Food Forest.

Viva Foundation's Food Forest forms part of its broader work to strengthen communities through food security, youth development and sustainable livelihoods.

The initiative was rooted in a simple belief: that Mandela Day should be about more than a single day of giving. It should be about finding ways to make a contribution that can take root and continue to make a difference long after the day has passed.

By contributing to the Food Forest, the Tribunal contributed to an initiative that provides fresh produce, encourages self-reliance and creates opportunities for communities to participate in growing food for themselves and others.

The initiative also offered staff an opportunity to reflect on what corporate social investment can mean in practice. Rather than simply making a once-off contribution, the aim was to support something capable of growing, producing and giving back over time.



That makes the humble seedling an apt symbol for the initiative. Its value is not measured only by what it is on the day it is planted, but by what it becomes.



At Viva Foundation's Refilwe campus, the Tribunal's contribution may begin with seedlings. But the hope is that what grows from them will be considerably greater: healthier children and communities, greater food security and a reminder that meaningful change often begins with something small.

From the classroom to the Tribunal

For many learners, Business Studies is something encountered in textbooks: a collection of rules, principles and unfamiliar cases belonging to a world far removed from their own.

By Gillian de Gouveia

**THE
TRIBUNAL'S
SCHOOLS'
PROGRAMME
IS DESIGNED
TO CHANGE
THAT.**



Through its Schools' Programme, the Tribunal this year joined forces with *Mamelodi Initiative*, a non-profit organisation that empowers students in Mamelodi, through education, mentorship and opportunities. *Mamelodi Initiative* runs several programmes throughout the year, each designed to support academic excellence and personal development among high school learners. In August 2026, the Tribunal opened its doors to Matric and Grade 11 Business Studies learners, giving them an opportunity to see competition law in action and, perhaps more importantly, to see themselves as future participants in South Africa's competition law system.



The programme deliberately puts people at the centre of the experience



The programme brings together learners from schools in disadvantaged communities and introduces them to the work of the Tribunal, the principles of competition law and the people behind the institution. It provides a rare opportunity to move from theory to practice: from learning about markets in a classroom to seeing how decisions about mergers, restrictive practices and abuse of dominance are considered in a real-world setting.

A typical visit begins with learners observing a live Tribunal hearing. For students accustomed to encountering competition law only as concepts on a page, sitting in the hearing room brings those concepts to life. They can see the legal process unfold, observe the arguments presented before the Tribunal and begin to understand how competition law operates within the broader economy.



In sessions led by Tribunal officials and case managers, learners explore topics including mergers, cartel conduct and other prohibited practices. They learn not only what the law says, but why it matters i.e. how anti-competitive conduct can affect businesses, consumers, entrepreneurs and the wider economy.

Through *Meet the Experts* sessions and opportunities to ask questions, learners are also introduced to the range of careers that contribute to the Tribunal's work. Lawyers and economists may be the most visible faces of competition law, but the effective functioning of a specialist institution depends on a much broader range of skills and professions. That exposure matters.

For a young person deciding what to study, a career can feel abstract until they encounter someone doing that work. A visit to the Tribunal can turn an unfamiliar profession into a possibility - and a possibility into an ambition.

The programme, therefore, serves two purposes. It helps learners understand competition law and its place in South Africa's economy, while also broadening their horizons about prospective careers within the legal, economic and public-service professions.

There is a larger lesson, too. Competition is not simply a technical concept reserved for lawyers, economists or regulators. It shapes the markets in which businesses operate, the choices available to consumers and the opportunities available to entrepreneurs. Understanding how markets work (and what happens when competition is undermined) is part of understanding how an economy works. By bringing learners into the Tribunal, the Schools' Programme makes that connection tangible.





A classroom lesson becomes a hearing. A textbook concept becomes a real case. A career description becomes a conversation with someone doing the work.

And, perhaps most importantly, an institution that may once have seemed distant becomes a place that young people can imagine themselves returning to. Not as visitors, but as the next generation of lawyers, economists, public servants or competition-law professionals.

The Tribunal's Schools Programme is ultimately an investment in something that cannot be measured by a single visit: possibility.



Tribunal Tribune

EDITORIAL TEAM

Ratshi Maphwanya

Editor-in-Chief

Jabulani Ngobeni

Editor

Gillian de Gouveia

Editor & Designer



queries@comptrib.co.za



www.comptrib.co.za



[@comptrib](https://twitter.com/comptrib)



Competition Tribunal of South Africa



1st floor, Mulayo,
the dtic Campus,
77 Meintjies Street,
Sunnyside,
Pretoria